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Introduction:
The centralized third-party authentication model for digital identity validation is obsolete
in light of newer and more secure means of ensuring accurate digital identification.
Governments, private organizations, and citizens should be encouraged to explore the means by
which they can maximize the latest in digital developments to protect themselves and their online
identities. California should begin to implement the precepts of the decentralized Self-Sovereign
Identity (SSI) model, which is superior to its predecessor in its simplicity, as it requires only
three things to validate a digital identity: (1) a blockchain which has the information necessary to
satisfy the consensus algorithm ensuring adequate replication across the network nodes; (2)
verifiable credentials; and (3) decentralized identifiers.1 Because this system is predicated on a
trustless Proof of Work (PoW) model, at present, blockchains are practically immutable, thus
making it impossible to falsify or forge information on them. The use of cryptographic hash
functions ensures that the security of each block of data is independently secured from one
another, and ultimately known only to the controller and owner of the information: the user.
California should join other state and national governments in the research and implementation
of SSI-compliant models of governance to better protect and support the needs of its citizenry in
an increasingly digitized world.
Part I of this paper explains the current centralized model of the internet and digital
identity. Part II addresses the history of digital identity and its growth toward self-sovereign
identity. Part III of this paper analyzes digital identity and U.S. state laws while Part IV
highlights various use cases from the United States and Estonia. Part V of this paper
recommends how the California DMV can learn from these use cases and implement its own
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systems of SSI-compliance. Lastly, Part VI summarizes the conclusions drawn from the
aforementioned sections and best practices for California and the DMV.
I.

Overview of the Centralized Model of Digital Identity

Centralization is the concept by which the modern internet operates. An example of a
centralized system is a social media platform, such as Facebook, Google, or Twitter, which use
systems of controls to govern their platform and their users. Centralization gives those in
positions of authority near-total control over the data on their platforms. When a user accesses a
social media site, that company has complete control over the different aspects of their features
including the ability to decide who can and cannot join the platform. Initially, this would seem
benign. In the long run, however, private entities could decide the authentication and validation
of a digital identity and a user would be without recourse if the authenticator decided that the
entity requesting the digital identity was not themself. This would further perpetuate any damage
a faux identity would be able to do online, as they would be said to have the explicit backing of
any such authenticating organization.
For example, in 2015 Yahoo became aware of a data breach relating to their email service
resulting in one of the largest email breaches in history.2 This meant that nearly 500 million
people were subjected to the whims and decisions of a person who had gained access to those
accounts by falsely-identifying themselves as the user.3 The malicious actor gained access to
everything Yahoo had gathered about their users, including the contents of emails, the senders
and receivers for those emails and the dates and times those emails were sent. Worse still, the
hackers gained access to Yahoo’s records, including sign-up information like a user’s full name,
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nationality, date of birth, and any other information necessary to register on the platform.4 As
discussed in Part V below, this model of data management and security is failing both users and
organizations. The need to reevaluate and pivot away from the centralized model is an
increasingly expensive proposition to ignore.
II.

The History & Implementation of Self-Sovereign Data
A. The Concept of a Digital Identity Developed Alongside the Internet:
Identity is a uniquely human concept. It is that ineffable “I” of self-consciousness,

something that is understood worldwide by every person living in every culture. As René
Descartes said: Cogito ergo sum — I think, therefore I am.5
In modern societies, such simple rhetorical devices fall flat in the face of legally
recognized entities which can issue identification documents and other forms of validation. But
the conflation of state issued credentials and identity are inherently problematic. If identity and
the validating credentials for that identity were merged into one, a person could theoretically lose
his very identity if a state revokes his credentials or even if he just crosses state borders. 6 Should
Descartes choose to revise his infamous turn of phrase, he may instead proffer: Puto sed non sum
— I think, but I am not.
Identity in the digital world is trickier still. It suffers from the same problem of
centralized control, but it is simultaneously disparate: identities are piecemeal, differing from one
Internet domain to another. As the digital world becomes increasingly connected to the physical
world, it also presents a new opportunity; it offers the possibility of redefining modern concepts
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of identity. It might allow us to place identity back under our control — once more reuniting
identity with the ineffable “I.”7
In the Internet’s early days, digital identities were solely controlled and administered via
a single authority such as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, which coordinates the global
Domain Name System Root, IP addressing, and other internet protocol resources. 8 Alternatively
they could be managed via hierarchies such as those created by the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers, which continues to organize and arbitrate domain names.9 While
these authorities were useful in their way, they represent the quintessential danger of
centralization: users have no recourse and no alternative should they receive an unfavorable
determination regarding their request for identity validation.
As the internet has grown and matured, the balkanization of digital identities has too. The
previous system of hierarchies gave birth to Certificate Authorities, which today issue Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) certificates used to validate digital identities.10 But this forces users to
utilize multiple digital identities on a variety of sites so that they might access any given site; in
so doing, users must agree to forgo any control over their information. This agreement to forgo
ownership of their data, enabling companies to operate at a profit, creates a perverse incentive
whereby the very thing which makes us human, our identity, on the internet makes us subject to
becoming commercialized.11
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At the turn of the new millennium, the internet changed in a way which is still affecting
the use and organization of the internet today. It moved away from a single authoritative entity
and towards one of federated identity. In the federated identity model, the new process of digital
validation permitted a user to access many websites or platforms with a single identity.12 Today
these services are known as Single Sign On (SSO). When the SSO is properly authenticated, it
allows a user to access a multitude of sites or content within sites without needing to validate
their identity each time.13 These improvements to digital validation and identification are clear,
given the end user’s ease of use and simplification of identity verification. However, the
federated system still fails to resolve the fundamental issues regarding the lack of user-control
and digital identities across the internet.14
The Internet evolved again in the mid 2000’s into a user-centric identity model in which
an individual or administrative organization controls site access across multiple authorities. This
change gave rise to a new school of thought with respect to digital identity and data
accumulation. With a focus on the minimization of data collection and decentralization of
identity verification, Ken Jordan and co-authors penned the Augmented Social Network, in which
they posited that the internet of tomorrow could be purpose-built to include concepts built into
the architecture of the internet, such as digital identity and trust.15 Organizations like the Identity
Commons have expanded on this concept, advocating for the facilitation, support, promotion,
and creation of an open identity layer for the Internet, one that maximizes control, convenience,
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and privacy for the individual while encouraging the development of healthy, interoperable
communities.16
Today, the focus for organizations and advocates like the Identity Commons and Ken
Jordan is the evolution of digital identity and the returning of control across the Internet to the
user. In this stage of the Internet’s development, decentralized concepts such as blockchain form
the core of SSI-systems. A decentralized SSI compliant Internet is understood to be the next
wave of digital identity management.17 It requires that the user be the center of that identity’s
administration. In addition to user-control, these data sets must be interoperable across the
Internet, with the user’s consent, but also autonomously. Critically, an SSI must also be
distributed. By its terms it cannot be kept or stored in a single place, for otherwise it would only
be a portable centralized system.
This is where blockchains, which are cryptographically secured and mathematically
assured, provide individual users with an opportunity to take control of their digital identity and
to claim ownership over it. In this environment, a trustless Proof of Work (PoW) model ensures
that the data presented is genuine.18 This is effectuated through a decentralized consensus
mechanism that requires members of a network to expend effort solving an arbitrary
mathematical puzzle.19 This process forms the consensus mechanism that allows anonymous
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entities in decentralized networks to trust the results of the algorithmic puzzle without even
knowing the actual identity of the user validating the transaction.20
It is critical that the individual is protected, even in a trustless system. Bad actors in a
centralized system can attempt to exploit known cybersecurity weaknesses to gain entry into
systems in which they are not permitted. By contrast the PoW model requires that for an entity to
access information stored on the blockchain, they must first validate their identity through the
consensus mechanism described above. This increase in security and privacy heightens the
accuracy and verifiability of the data exchange while ensuring critical information and
transactions are not impermissibly accessed.21
To create a self-sovereign identity within this environment, a user or organization must
establish three elements: (1) a blockchain with the information necessary to satisfy the consensus
algorithm ensuring adequate replication across the network nodes; (2) verifiable credentials; and
(3) decentralized identifiers.22 The first element begins with the implementation of blockchains
which are further discussed below. The second element is credentials which can be verified and
is already something utilized in daily life (e.g., driver’s license, passport, birth certificate, etc.).
These credentials need only to be converted into a digital copy which simply acts as a digital
watermark for the data. When combined with a cryptographic key it would ensure that the actual
data is never revealed while the validation of that data is completed instantaneously.23 To
complete that instantaneous transaction, organizations must have the third element established in
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the decentralized identifiers. These are global, unique, and persistent identifiers.24 These
identifiers allow for the creation of unique, private, and secure peer-to-peer connections between
two parties. Moreover, their decentralized nature makes credentials always available for
verification while each party, an individual or organization, can create as many different
identifiers as they wish which ultimately allows a single user to use a single credential for any
transaction or interaction without a need for a second or alternative identification method.25 This
individualization of identification in fact only heightens the security around the user, as using
separate identifiers for different digital relationships and contexts prevents data correlation.26
Lastly, these identifiers are entirely controlled by the identity owner. They are independent of
centralized registries, authorities, or identity providers.27 Thus, to establish a genuine SSI model,
an organization must implement the three elements of (1) blockchain technology; (2) verifiable
credentials; and (3) decentralized identifiers.
B. Element One: The Foundation of Blockchains & Distributed Ledgers
To establish an SSI, there must be sufficient technology and ability to form a foundation
which is sufficiently replicable while also sufficiently fast to maintain use of service throughout
the validation process. To start, there are already several types of blockchains which could serve
as an avenue for this kind of sensitive and highly private information.28 Generally speaking these
blockchains are private, decentralized, and only the user holds the cryptographic key to access
the information stored on the blockchain.29
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Blockchain is the technology underlying the concept of SSI. There are two types of
blockchains, public and private. A public blockchain is open to anyone who wants to join and
has the computing power to do so, whereas a private blockchain requires an invitation from the
blockchain owner and must validate the identity of the user by the network starter or through
rules established by the network starter.30 Both kinds of blockchains permit the creation and
proliferation of decentralized databases across “nodes” or other computers, which provide
control over the evaluation of data between entities. This is accomplished through peer-to-peer
networks relying on consensus algorithms, like PoW, which provide assurances as to the
replicability to other nodes on the network. Put simply, blockchains allow users around the world
to access the same source of information, with every change, edit, alteration, and adjustment laid
bare for all to see.31
This is executed without ever revealing the underlying data to users or verifiers. This is
possible because of the “Zero Knowledge Proof,” which exchanges and registers the actual user
data and allows two different actors, the user and the verifier, to exchange the ownership of a
piece of data, without revealing the data itself.32 The math, probability and cryptography behind
this technology makes its applications useful. For example, it would allow a person to prove the
ownership of a credential to the verifier, such as a driver’s license, without revealing the initial
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identifying information.33 In this instance, a person could use a QR code which could be scanned
by a store employee to validate that the person is of-age and is allowed to purchase alcohol.
These proofs are predicated on the use of cryptographic hash functions, algorithms which
take an arbitrary quantity of data inputs (e.g., a verifiable credential such as the information on a
driver’s license) and then create an output in response to those inputs which is known as a
“hash.”34 Once the hashing is complete, the data can be safely stored and the password to that
data is no longer needed to validate the user’s identity.35
This system of zero knowledge proofs and trustless confirmation of transactions offers
many advantages over the current username and password combination, including: one-way
functioning, which makes reconstruction of the hash nearly impossible; the avalanche effect, in
which one change along the chain causes every block to change in response; non-predictability,
meaning hash values are non-predictable from the password; and collision resistance, which
makes finding two passwords that hash the same enciphered text exponentially more difficult.36
Each of these technological evolutions serve to further advance protections and privacy for users
and their data.37
It is necessary to highlight the real and theoretical shortcomings of this technology and its
impacts if it were to be exploited. There is a single known real-world risk to the use of public
blockchains and two known risks associated with the systems which blockchain employs. First,
33
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the direct threat to a blockchain is known as a fifty-one percent (51%) attack. It is considered
inapplicable to private blockchains because of the sole-source of control which governs the
private blockchain; whereas public blockchains are controlled across a nodule-system, open to
anyone who seeks to join, thus allowing a malicious actor to gain control over more than their
own node.38 This attack requires that a bad actor take over 51% of all nodes to change or use the
information written on a blockchain.39 For comparison, this method is akin to the “brute-force”
method employed by hackers against centralized systems. Just as with the brute-force attack,
users subjected to a 51% attack are aware of the malicious action and should they desire to, may
disconnect from the internet and flag the event as a bad actor.40 These kinds of attacks are
possible on small-scale blockchains but are nearly impossible as the blockchains scale up, as the
malicious actor would need exponentially more computing power to control national or
international blockchains.
The technologies which support blockchains, however, are just as susceptible to bad
actors as their centralized forerunners because they are both tethered to human action as the
source of the error. For example, “creation errors” are errors in a blockchain’s execution of a
smart contract.41 The risk here is that the smart contract can become vulnerable to malicious
action when the terms of the smart contract’s execution are ambiguous or vague.42 In the real
world, this is no different from a contract which is poorly worded and results in unfavorable
terms. However, unlike in the physical world, a creation error can be quickly resolved when
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identified by providing clarifying guidance to the smart contract to better execute its task.43 The
second known risk to blockchain implementation is insufficient security.44 Because blockchains
themselves are secure, there have been many reported breaches of entities which employ the use
of blockchains, such as cryptocurrency exchanges.45 However, these breaches in many cases
have been as a result of a failure to properly secure and protect the network from external threats
and bad actors.46 Therefore, just as with creation errors, human error or complacency pose more
risks to blockchains than the blockchains themselves.47
Alternatively, the theoretical risks to blockchains are not insignificant. For the time being,
these threats are speculative, but could become at-risk should quantum computers48 or optimized
hashing tables49 become commonplace. These risks are also a threat in a centralized system of
digital identity and therefore should not be seen only as a threat to an SSI-compliant system.50
The final theoretical risk to blockchains are “past-known collisions,” which when charted across
enough time and data can help a malicious actor to better guess at the underlying algorithm
employed by the particular blockchain in ensuring security.51 Each of these risks are means by
which entities would seek to use the mathematically-immutable nature of a blockchain against
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itself to crack its cryptographic system.52 These risks, because of the size of computing power
required to employ them, are almost certain to originate from a state-sponsor and not from
individual actors or groups of actors.53
C. Element Two: The Attestation & Verifiable Credentials
A verifiable credential protocol, as defined by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is
in essence the process for the digital watermarking of claims data through a combination of
public key cryptography and privacy-preserving techniques to prevent correlation.54 This process
means that not only can physical credentials safely be turned digital, but also that holders of such
credentials can selectively disclose specific information from this credential without exposing
the actual data (e.g., showing a QR code for scanning to validate age of a person) and
third-parties are instantly able to verify this data without having to call upon the issuer.55
The three components required to establish a valid verifiable credential are: (1) metadata;
(2) claims; and (3) proofs.56 Metadata is cryptographically signed by the issuer. It “describe[s]
properties of the credential, such as the issuer, the expiry date and time, a representative image, a
public key to use for verification purposes, the revocation mechanism, and so on.”57 Claims are
statements made about a subject (e.g., John was born on April 1, 2000), while proofs are data
about the person (e.g., an identity holder like John) that allows others to verify the source of the
data (e.g., the issuer), validates that the data belongs to you (and only you), that the data has not
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been tampered with, and finally, that the data has not been revoked by the issuer.58 Taken
together these elements provide security — even in a trustless environment — that the provided
credentials are tamper-proof, portable, and verifiable anywhere, at any time. These elements
ensure that the credentials and underlying information remains private to all but the data holder.59
D. Element Three: Security, Privacy & Decentralized Identifiers
Currently, digital identities are validated not by an issuer or the user, but by
intermediaries such as Facebook, ID.me, Google, etc. 60 Because this data must be assessed by
intermediaries, the metadata gathered by those parties from the interactions over those
connections are not within the user or issuer’s control.61 This loss of individual data control
means that the intermediary can use that data for commercialized purposes such as advertising
whether or not the individual wants it to happen.62
Thus, under the banner of Decentralized Identifiers (DID), there are two categories: (1)
Public, and (2) Private DIDs. Private DIDs may be transferred between two parties creating a
secured channel which no outside party can access. An additional benefit to private DIDs is that
they are unlimited, and therefore one user may have many private DIDs and none of them rely on
a centralized authority to authenticate the identities. Should private DIDs become commonplace,
it would effectively destroy the current structure of the ad-based open internet because collectors
of this data would be stopped by the private DID transaction from gathering data about the user.63
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Alternatively, public DIDs would be items which a user would want published (e.g., a valid
digital driver's license). Public DIDs could also be the verifying central authority which would
validate a subsequent private DID between a user and organization.64
The mechanism employed by DIDs to ensure the correctness of the various inputs is the
smart contract. Smart contracts are simply programs stored on a blockchain that run when
predetermined conditions are met. They typically are used to automate the execution of an
agreement so that all participants can be immediately certain of the outcome, without any
intermediary’s involvement or time loss. They can also automate a workflow, triggering the next
action when conditions are met.65
In practice, when the government issues a driver’s license, they create a physical card
which is intended to be carried by the user. With a public DID, the user could create a QR code
which would validate their identity in the event a police officer pulled them over. This method
also precludes the unwilling sharing of private information by no longer requiring another entity
to individually verify the identity of the user.66 By way of example, if a person goes to purchase
alcohol, they would be asked for their proof of age. Relying on the partnership between public
and private DIDs, a user could show the verifier a QR code which when scanned would reach
beyond their private DID to the issuer, which is almost always the government, who would
validate the private DID’s interaction because of the information stored on the public DID.67 To
the user and teller, it simply looks like scanning a code and the return response indicates that the
user is permitted to conduct the purchase. The effect of these systems is to expedite the
interaction and increase security, privacy, and efficiency.68
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III.

The United States & the State of Digital Identity
The United States was created as a constitutional federal republic. The lines of authority

between states and the federal government are, to a significant extent, defined by the United
States Constitution and relevant case law. This separation of power between the federal and state
governments creates an inherently limited central government while permitting an expansive
grant of power and autonomy to the States and Territories.69 The net effect of such a system
permits states to act in disparate, and at times, incongruent ways to one another.
As a result, the authority to resolve questions around privacy, data security and
technology have been largely left to the individual states to resolve.70 States from across the
national and ideological divide have been more than happy to fill the gap left by federal
legislators and regulators, determining for their own jurisdictions how to utilize and deploy
technology to support increased user control of their information online.
A. State Policy Actions:
State governments—in contrast to their federal partners—have begun rapidly expanding
their research, use, and application of blockchain-based projects as a means of implementing a
host of blockchain-powered changes. In 2021, seventeen states introduced more than 45 pieces
of legislation respecting issues of blockchain and governance.71 In 2022, 37 states introduced
more than 164 pieces of legislation on these same issues.72 For its part, California amended the
Budget Act of 2021 to require, “[t]he Department of Technology shall consider the use of various
technologies that support privacy protections, including blockchain technology or single digital
69
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identifiers, when planning and developing the Digital Identification pilot program.”73 In its
current session the Legislature is discussing SB 1190, Creating the Department of Technology:
California Trust Framework, which would require the department by 2024 to provide industry
standards and best practices regarding the issuances of credentials to verify information about the
person or a legal entity. The bill as presently debated requires that this Framework be designed to
be interoperable with other government trust and governance frameworks for verifiable
credentials.74
Shortly after passage of the 2021 Budget Act, California Governor Gavin Newsom
signed Executive Order N-9-22 instructing state executive agencies in part to, “...assess how to
deploy blockchain technology for state and public institutions, and build research and workforce
development pathways to prepare Californians for success in this industry.”75 This order directed
executive agencies to begin formally exploring how the implementation of blockchain can be
utilized to benefit Californians and keep the State at the forefront of innovation.
In accordance with the 2021 Budget Act and Governor Newsom’s Order, the DMV began
exploration of a modernization program.76 The DMV began its modernization program to secure
a flexible and scalable Platform as a Service solution to provide workflow-based process
optimization for their legacy Occupational Licensing applications.77 In parallel to this program,
the department began, in response to California Vehicle Code Section 13020’s passage, to chart a
path for a program which would comply with the statute’s provision granting the department the
ability to seek mobile or digital alternatives to driver’s licenses and identification cards.78
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However, the program did not call for a blockchain enabled platform and expressly stipulated
that the database must be centralized.79
IV.

Use Cases Illustrating the Increasing Cost of Failure of the Centralized Model of
Digital Identity & the Superiority of the Self-Sovereign Identity Model:
As the digital environment continues to develop and mature, governments seeking to

maintain control and oversight must adapt or fall victim to their complacency. In 2021 IM
Security conducted a global study of the cost related to data breaches resulting from single point
of failure and found that the global average breach rose in cost from $3.86 million in 2020 to
$4.24 million in 2021.80 Astonishingly, the report showed that for the past 11 years the healthcare
industry was the top target for bad actors costing that sector an average of $9.23 million dollars
per breach in 2021.81 During that same time, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) reported
more than 847,000 complaints of cyber-crime: a seven percent increase from the year prior!82
The current system of centralized control is failing both users and holders of digital identities.83
In the face of unprecedented social, economic, and political disruption, 74% of
respondents agreed that the traditional ways of doing business are not sustainable.84 Technology
is at the root of much of this disruption — but in the case of blockchain, it can also be the
remedy. By automating redundant processes and sharing data among permissioned network
members in a decentralized way, blockchain reduces traditional friction between systems and
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unlocks the value long trapped inside hardened organizational information silos.85 The result is
newfound trust and transparency across the economy to include food supplies, supply chains,
financial services, energy supplies, identity validation and more.86 Within the public sector there
are a multiplicity of organizations working at all levels to prove blockchain’s value in leading the
digital transformation of government. Three use cases in particular highlight the potential for
government deployment of blockchain: the Estonian model for an SSI-compliant decentralized
system and the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI);87 and Wyoming’s passage
of the Digital Identity Act. 88
A. Case Study 1: Estonia & the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure
In an effort to bring their nation online and into the modern era, leaders in Estonia after
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 sought to digitize their nation. For perspective, the nation
gained independence in 1991; at that time, more than ten percent of its population was
unemployed and Estonia had a gross domestic product at nearly thirty times lower than that of its
Scandinavian neighbors.89 Thirty-two years later, Estonia has free high speed wireless internet
nationwide, universal online voting, digital tax collection and online prescription filling
systems.90 They were able to do this because of the government’s investment in digital identity
cards and an innovation-friendly environment which fostered the third-highest number of
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startups per capita in Europe.91 These benefits are not limited to Estonian citizens and are
extended to e-residents too.92 An e-resident can live outside Estonia and needs only to hold a
valid government issued ID, pay a fee, and complete an online application to become an
e-Estonian resident.93 In doing so, e-residents can act and operate as owners and proprietors of
businesses within Estonia without ever leaving their own home country.94
Estonia was slow and methodical in its application and execution of systems of digital
identification, first targeting populations with significantly younger or older people (e.g., schools
or retirement communities).95 Secondly, Estonia’s passage of the Public Information Act of 2000
was an important step in growing its digital identity systems as it mandated a single data
repository across the country, the X-Road system.96 The Act further prohibited requesting
duplicate information for public services, thereby mandating information sharing across
government departments and functions.97 Estonia raised its digital literacy rate from
approximately ten percent in 2000 to nearly eighty-nine percent of all Estonians today. Nearly
ninety-nine percent of all government services are now offered digitally.98
To achieve this feat, the Government partnered with private sector banks and
telecommunications companies, who would benefit from the widespread adoption of digital ID
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cards and digital signatures.99 These private partners agreed to shoulder some of the cost of the
X-Road system infrastructure implementation.100 This demonstrates the benefit of industry
support; although digital ID cards had been introduced in 1998, they failed to gain widespread
adoption until the industry-funded program stepped in, demonstrating the benefit of industry
support.101 To ensure sustained progress, the Estonian government slowly made adoption of
digital IDs mandatory, providing free nationwide internet services to accommodate this
requirement.102 The government reported that these changes have generated approximately two
percent in additional GDP annually since its implementation. 103
To expound on the lessons learned from the Estonian experiment, the European Union
(E.U.) enacted the Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services (eIDAS)
regulation which laid the framework for a European-wide interoperable and transparent digital
identity system, prefiguring some of the SSI tenets.104 The regulation stipulated that by 2018 all
citizens of the bloc would be able to use their national electronic identification (eID) in any
Member-State.105 This was the single greatest factor in the facilitation of the creation of the
European Digital Single Market, where citizens and companies can also access a European
market of recognized “Trusted Services” whose certifications and authentications are legally
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valid across the E.U.106 Additional projects are ongoing in the E.U. and include a supra-national
version of the Estonian program known as the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure
(EBSI) framework, which is expected to publish its first use cases for review in 2024.107
B. Case Study 2: Wyoming & Digital Identity
To engage in most aspects of civil society, a government issued identification document
is necessary. While there is no nationally recognized American identification card, there are
government-backed identity systems provided by different federal, state, and local entities such
as drivers’ licenses or birth certificates. 108 This legacy infrastructure, implemented between
1970-1989, is generally outmoded, outdated, and outclassed by the standards of today.109 It has
failed to keep up with the best practices for organizations handling this kind of information while
also having the effect of lowering Americans' belief in their government to be efficient or
modernize.110 In 2016, the Government Office of Accountability concluded that “legacy federal
[information technology] investments are becoming obsolete.”111 The federal systems aren’t the
only ones at risk, as Americans are commonly required to present their social security number
(or card) for most things such as apartment applications, doctor visits, and employment.112 Each
of these uses, which were not the intended use of the social security number, includes a litany of
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security risks to both the individual and the organization as the data can be stolen at nearly every
step of the process.113 This outdated form of identity is overdue for modernization.114
Recognizing the absence of federal leadership, Wyoming decided to take it upon itself to
act. State policymakers reached out to contacts in the private sector to assist the state in devising
a method of digitizing records and identities.115 In 2020 that effort culminated in the passage of
H.B. 5, allowing residents to obtain a digital driver’s license and an identification card to
supplement the use of physical IDs in the state.116 In doing so, Wyoming became the seventh
jurisdiction in the United States to incorporate a digital identification card for use by residents
and law enforcement.117 Just one year later the state would again push the limits of digital
identification by codifying the Digital Identity Act of 2021 into law. This law, the first of its kind
in the United States, defines digital identity as “the intangible digital representation of, by and
for a natural person, over which he has principal authority and through which he intentionally
communicates or acts.”118
Since the Act’s passage, Wyoming has begun an exploration of an interstate model, like
that enumerated under the Estonian and eIDAS system. Wyoming has begun soliciting other
states to enroll in their pilot eID system; a trust framework with a scheme such as eIDAS instead
of a federal eID could be established.119 It remains to be seen how such an interstate network
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would be managed, much less funded, when no one state has any inherent authority, but the
model is promising for the integration and interpolation of SSIs in the United States.
V.

A Path to Digital Deliverance: Self-Sovereign Identities and Good Governance
The State of California has a prominent history of supporting, developing, and

implementing technological changes which have impacted the course of human history.120
Producers, consumers, and users of digital material are recognizing the internet as an information
superhighway which allows for anyone, anywhere, to question anything: even a person’s
identity.121 Failure to protect these digital identities now will only hurt those who have already
been most affected by the increasing digitization of modern life: the poor, the unbanked, the
unhoused, and others.122 For this reason, Governor Newsom’s Executive Order regarding the
exploration of the use of blockchains represents a powerful statement of California’s values
respecting the need for inclusivity.123
A. Lessons for the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
The California DMV is in a unique position as one of the largest holders of Californians
personal information while simultaneously being one of the only state-wide agencies capable of
implementing the improvements necessary to create an SSI-compliant model of governance.
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As an example, in 2018 the DMV began issuance of REAL IDs, in compliance with the
REAL ID Act of 2005. The purpose of the amended licenses was to preclude holders from
obtaining multiple valid licenses or social security numbers while simultaneously allowing
government officials to verify immigration status.124 But the rollout of the physical IDs was
marred with reports of significant delays relating to the physical assets of the department in
addition to those of its information technology division.125 The DMV sought to address this issue
directly in its 2021-2026 Strategic Plan, which included the goal of delivering a “simpler, faster
way to fulfill customer needs through expanded digital services.”126 However, this goal fell short
of identifying how the department intended to produce such capabilities or detail the means in
which it would seek to protect and secure user data. In light of the increasing attacks against
centralized systems and the costs of defending against those attacks,127 the DMV must look to
another method, other than the centralized and user-centric model which has resulted in losses of
trust and security between users, third party vendors and the department itself.128
Thus the question then becomes: how can the DMV begin the process for validating and
securing digital identities in an increasingly digitized world? To achieve a truly self-sovereign
identity, the DMV need only look to schemes like that of Estonia or the broader eIDAS
framework for functional workability. Digital citizenship under the Estonian framework would
permit people living in other jurisdictions to access California governance structures online
and/or in the metaverse, to open businesses, and to simultaneously identify with the state’s ethos.
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This type of digital engagement could draw investment and entrepreneurship in emerging
industries – particularly those that will address consumer needs in California, and among target
demographic groups, despite individual locations. Estonia’s e-residency program is a prime
example of an SSI-compliant system which allows anyone in the world to access its digital
identity platform while benefiting the Estonian government. Through this platform, e-residents
have access to the EU’s specific business environment and can use the EU’s public e-services.
Digital citizenship could allow California to attract resources from other jurisdictions with solid
governance frameworks and diversify state budget revenue streams, even if quality of life issues
lead to net outflows of talent.129
Under a California-compliant iteration of the Estonian scheme, the DMV, in reliance on
state agencies such as the California Department of Public Health, would be able to validate a
user’s digital identity simply through certification of the credentials provided at the point of
service or online. There is precedent for this type of project. In 2011 nine states signed onto the
Health Care Compact of 2011 when they agreed to form a single standard for care, responsibility,
funding, amendments, and withdrawal procedures. These states continue to work toward a
universal standard for health care professionals across the United States.130 In this system, the
California Department of Public Health, already having the necessary data, would permit the
DMV to simply validate the information it has and thus would promote a greater unity of
knowledge among the agencies while further protecting the user’s personal information. This
mirrors what Wyoming, under its eID pilot program, is seeking to establish. In this way, states
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would have the power to assert the standards of digital care which they would see mirrored
across all other jurisdictions within the pilot.
The DMV only needs to expand the processes and services which are offered online and
ensure they are interconnected and interoperable to achieve the same effect of the X-Road
system Estonia took 25 years to implement. Moreover, Estonia’s development demonstrates that
governments do not need to replicate one another to achieve a level of technological
sophistication; rather, they stand to benefit from those who have already gone before them and
can instead implement the programs which worked well. The DMV therefore could choose to
enact a system similar to Estonia’s X-Road system while employing Wyoming’s private sector
knowledge and experience to build a network which would be first rate. Similarly, a
whole-society strategy provides synergies that stopping at a single department or service could
not. Wherever possible, projects that connect services and will be used by the broadest possible
swath of society both build momentum and create network effects that make it easier to connect
increasing numbers of government departments. In fact, analysis of the number of data
repositories connected to X-Road and the number of queries made suggests that exponential
growth in querying takes off around the 50th data repository linked, out of more than 200
repositories currently linked through the system.131
As one of the largest repositories of California residents’ information, the DMV would be
a natural place to begin with the creation of a system which would, as the Estonian model
illustrates, bring more users online and do so by means which place user security and protection
at the forefront. To effectively highlight this opportunity, the Department must begin to rethink
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how it approaches digital identity and storage. It need not adjust its current course of business
immediately, but it should begin the process for supporting and engaging with SSI-compliant
models of governance. The EBSI model is particularly useful as a benchmark, setting a
five-stage process for establishing the viability of such operations within the organization.132
Step One: Identify Use Cases. The DMV need not look far to establish a plethora of use
cases whereby government agencies, foreign and domestic, have engaged with issues of SSI and
returning information stored on centralized government systems to users such as those of Estonia
or the EBSI framework under review in the E.U.133
Step Two: Select Use Cases. Once the DMV identifies which use cases it seeks to
emulate, it can employ the methods and lessons learned to navigate a path forward for itself.134
Step Three: Identify the Ecosystem. When the DMV establishes its preferred use cases,
it should look to which system within its administrative control would be best suited for the role
in a pilot program. There are several notable projects which the department could seek to
implement this SSI-compliant system; notably its virtual wallet would be an ideal test.135
Step Four: Plan the Implementation. The DMV will need to establish the parameters of
its physical capabilities and whether it might be necessary to purchase, or outsource, the
necessary infrastructure to execute the pilot. Here it would be helpful to look at the Wyoming
program for digital licenses, where they partnered with private companies to host their data as
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“certified service providers” while the pilot for the Safe ID is ongoing.136 However, with the
onset of the California Privacy Rights Act in January 2023 and enforcement by the California
Privacy Protection Agency, the DMV must also consider the impacts and limitations imposed to
determine the pilot’s eventual scope.
Step Five: Execute the Pilot. Having planned, organized, and established its purpose
and goal, the Department should begin implementation of its pilot, ensuring compliance with all
regulatory laws, and upon completion, evaluate the successes and challenges of the pilot and
share those insights with other agencies and organizations within the state. This process of data
sharing only further highlights the inherent value of transparency and clarity for all users and
servicers.
The DMV has already taken the hardest step, which was to agree to start the process of
exploration of the scope and application of digital identities in the modern era. The revival of the
DMV’s pre-coronavirus blockchain pilots would be a simple but clear commitment towards
ensuring greater user security and data integrity for all Californians.137
VI.

Conclusion:
California has historically led the world in the discovery and application of new and

exciting technologies. The application of blockchain-based security systems should be no
different. Now is the time for the DMV to evaluate the value of a decentralized but still privately
controlled digital self-sovereign identity system. The results of pilot programs from Estonia to
Wyoming conclusively illustrate that SSI-based systems, when coupled with decentralized
systems of control, are superior to the older, and increasingly antiquated, centralized models.
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With blockchain technology, information about a digital identity is auditable, traceable,
and verifiable in just seconds. The benefits already exist across Europe and in at least seven
states where individuals can curate their own profiles and control data sharing.138 Issuers can
easily connect with others within and from without their jurisdiction and provide nearly instant
verification of credentials to verifiers. The simplicity of the SSI model makes clear that
California must flex its digital power and begin the integration of digital identities for all.
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